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Time and Money: An Examination of Crime,
Sentencing and Corrections Budgeting Issues

Jeanie Thies
Lindenwood University
America continues to recover from its most recent
recession, and the impact on social problems will
reverberate for years. In one respect, though, it
appears we can breathe easier: the crime wave that
many thought to be inevitable did not occur. Crime
has remained fairly stable and, in many states, has
even declined since the start of the recession, a fact
not entirely surprising among criminologists. While
many people assume it is inevitable that crime rises
when the economy is suffering, an examination of
historical trends reveals this is not the case. While
violent and property crime did increase during the
Great Depression, throughout the remainder of the
20th century and into the 21st, the relationship
between crime and the economy has been
inconsistent. Deeper analysis reveals a complex
relationship in which community-level variables
may trump macro-level conditions, and different
social policies may either push the crime rate up or
help constrain it. Yet the criminal justice system
suffered repercussions from the recession. The
immediate future regarding how the current
economic climate may affect correctional policy and
practice is discussed in this article. These projections
are discussed within the context of what history has
revealed regarding crime rates, sentencing practices,
and recidivism. Finally, some strategies for longterm investments to reduce crime are presented.
Over half of U.S. states had their corrections budgets
reduced as a result of the fiscal crisis.1 While it is
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fortunate we did not experience a jump in criminal
activity that would have placed greater demands on
the system, we are in hardly in a position in which
we can ignore the problem. We cannot simply cap
crime until the coffers are replenished. Correctional
agencies strapped for cash are not able to turn away
newly sentenced offenders. With little control over
crime rates and sentencing practices, correctional
systems must continue to accommodate new
offenders, while simultaneously meeting the needs
of existing populations in ways that do not
compromise public safety.
States have coped with a variety of adaptations.
These include layoffs, hiring and wage freezes,
cutting programs, eliminating or limiting nonessential services, and—either through consolidating
populations or early release mechanisms—closing
institutions.2 The impact of these actions is diverse,
diffuse, and not easily measured. A state-by-state
comparison of corrections budget appropriations for
the 2009-2010 fiscal year, determined when the
recession was still underway, reflected some of the
uncertainty regarding the immediate economic
future. Missouri saw just a 1.48 percent reduction in
its corrections budget during that fiscal period.3
Seven of the states for which fiscal data were
available that year experienced cuts in excess of 10
percent, although the budgets in eleven states
actually grew or remained stable.
Missouri has adapted to these cuts while continuing
to make significant investments in a platform of
programs and partnerships designed to ensure
successful reintegration of offenders. The 2010 fiscal
year budget included an additional $3 million to be
allocated towards a major reentry initiative,
Rethinking Policies and Practices,” Vera Institute of Justice,
updated July 2009, accessed November 1, 2013,
http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July2009.pdf.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.

2 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 1 (Fall/Winter 2013–14)

supplementing grant funding the state had received.4
This initiative is still underway, with the sixth round
of funding, exceeding $1.8 million, awarded to
selected community agencies in 2013.5 Increased
program spending in the midst of a fiscal crisis is not
as counter-intuitive as it may seem. Indeed, such
initiatives, that have been termed “reinvestments of
justice,” hold considerable promise for long-term
cost-efficient measures to lessen crime.

Factors influencing corrections growth
and spending
Predicting the future of corrections and project
spending needs is fraught with challenges. Certainly,
the demand for prison beds is largely impervious to
the availability of funds. Corrections expansion and
spending are inextricably tied to sentencing practice.
Sentencing changes that result from legislation
mandating prison terms have fairly predictable
impacts. For example, the three-strikes-you’re-out
and truth-in-sentencing statutes that became popular
in the late 1980s and 1990s fueled the prison boom
and resulting expenditures. (However, increasing the
capacity to lock up criminals for longer periods has
had mixed results, as discussed later in this article.)
But broad trends are largely a product of
discretionary practices, and these are notoriously
difficult to predict. Sentencing has a great deal to do
with how individual actors in the system behave.
Prosecutors and judges are politically motivated and
responsive to a variety of factors, both at the local
level and in regard to individual cases. It can be
argued that their behavior is, in large part, swayed by
public perceptions about crime control. In light of
the unpredictability of sentencing practices,
projection of prison populations and budgetary needs
is quite complicated.

Of course, crime rates affect sentencing trends, and
therefore should be predictive of corrections
spending. But they are no longer as important as
they once were. For most of the 20th century,
sentencing trends were a proximate reflection of
changing crime rates; that is, we tended to
incarcerate more offenders as crime rose and fewer
when crime fell. But things changed when a crime
wave broke out in the 1960s, gaining momentum in
the late 1970s, continuing through the 1980s and
early ’90s. In 1960, the violent crime rate in America
was 160.9, by 1991 it peaked at 758.1 (the rate is
computed per 100,000 people).6 It has further been
observed that the “punishment index,” which is the
probability an offender will be arrested combined
with the length of time he will serve, declined in the
late 1960s and ’70s.7 This suggests that crime was a
consequence of a lax criminal justice system that
was soft on crime. While criminologists do not
discount this, they also offer a plethora of other
explanations for the change in the rate. These
include baby boom-induced changes in the age
structure of the population, crumbling urban cores,
and the illicit drug trade (particularly crack cocaine),
among others.
The precipitous increase in the crime rate led to a
series of sentencing reforms designed to keep certain
groups of offenders behind bars for longer periods.
Prison populations skyrocketed in the 1980s and
1990s, slowly stabilizing in the 2000s. From 19902000, this country experienced an 81 percent
increase in its incarceration capacity in state prisons,
with the construction of 351 new adult facilities, an
expansion reaching to over half a million new prison
beds.8 Prior to the crime wave, the U.S.
imprisonment rate had held steady for nearly a
century. From 1880 to 1970, it hovered around 100200 persons per 100,000. The rate began to
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accelerate quite dramatically by the 1980s, and the
nationwide decline did not begin until 2009.9 On the
face of it, then, the burgeoning prison populations of
the late 20th century reflected nothing more than a
rational response to the climbing crime rates. Yet in
the last decade and a half, the two trends began to
diverge. The crime rate began to decline in the mid–
1990s, with the violent crime rate peaking at 758.1
in 1991, and has more or less leveled off in the 21st
century, with some minor year-to-year fluctuations.
By the close of 2012, the violent crime rate was
386.9.10
Missouri’s incarceration trend has followed the
national trend of lagging behind the crime trend. As
crime slowed, we continued to lock up offenders in
greater numbers, gradually stabilizing over a decade
after crime began to fall. The state’s index crime
rate11 fell 26 percent between 1992-2012, yet the
prison population nearly doubled during this same
timeframe, expanding from 16,181 state prisoners in
1992 to 31,517 in 2012.12
Missouri was hardly
unusual in this regard. While crime rates fell in 48
states between 1998 and 2012, only nine of these
experienced a decline in incarceration rates.13
Fear equates to continued support for expansive use
of incarceration. Fear of crime, which is largely
attributable to excessive media attention to violent
crimes, has not fallen commensurate with actual
crime.14 Thus, while sentencing does not appear to
9
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be entirely independent of crime rates, the trend is
not wholly rational and is a function of not simply
actual crime rates, but perceptions of these.
The high price of the incarceration boom is reflected
in the quadrupling of state corrections budgets in a
20-year period. Though inflation plays a role, the
significance of this increase is evident when we
compare it to other forms of public spending. Only
Medicaid grew more during this period.15 While
approximately 30 percent of states’ correctional
population is locked up, prisons consume 88 percent
of the budgets. 16 Thus, for over a quarter of century,
America sent more people to prison in the face of
falling crime rates, at greater cost. Only recently, in
perhaps the last five years, has the tide begun to turn.
Punishment and Politics
In mid-2010, Missouri’s Sentencing Commission
made headlines around the state with the release of a
matrix that provides criminal court judges
information regarding the relative costs of
sentencing
options.
The
matrix
offers
straightforward cost comparisons between prison
and probation sentences.17 The media coverage and
accompanying rhetoric suggested that judges were
being encouraged to save money by unleashing
dangerous offenders into the community. While a
purely dollars-driven approach to justice is
unsettling, the guidelines are considerably more
sophisticated. Judges are also given risk prediction
information based on an actuarial method of
determining who is likely to re-offend, a practice
that some prominent criminologists consider a
promising means of reducing crime.18 Reactions
from the criminal justice community have been
http://www.gallup.com/poll/144272/nearly-americans-fearwalking-alone-night.aspx.
15
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mixed, with some lawyers pointing out the merits of
a risk-based decision tool, while others have decried
it as an attempt to put a “price tag on justice.”19 Yet
the reality is that criminal justice system resources
are finite, and there are opportunity costs associated
with every decision to confine a low-risk offender.
Cost alone should not drive sentencing, but cost does
still matter, both in the sense of good fiscal policy
and public safety.
Given their politically sensitive positions, judges and
prosecutors who perceive that the public prefers
tougher sentences may opt to ignore data suggesting
that low-risk offenders could be safely supervised in
the community. They also have power to adjust
sentencing decisions downwards, despite guidelines
created by sentencing commissions and legislative
mandates.
These kinds of guidelines have constrained
discretion but have not been completely taken
discretion out of the equation. For example,
sentencing reforms introduced in the 1990s were
designed to limit discretion, and increase the time
certain offenders would spend behind bars.
However, these laws did not consistently produce
that effect. In some jurisdictions, judges and
prosecutors simply altered practices (for instance,
through plea bargaining) so as to reduce the number
of offenders subject to these laws.20
Such
adjustments are not inherently negative and
represent an attempt to allocate correctional
resources more efficiently or a response to
perception that strict application of the law results in
some unjust sentences. Presumably, too, these reflect
recognition that individual-level factors may be
more useful in determining an optimal sentence than
the nature of the offense. The combination of
discretionary practices and political pressures make
19
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it difficult to make accurate predictions regarding
how changing crime rates will influence corrections
growth.
Superficial analysis of these trends suggests this is a
cause-and-effect relationship, and that the
incarceration experiment succeeded and did in fact,
deter. However, a state-by-state analysis carried out
by the Sentencing Project shows it is not this simple.
Between 1991 and 1998, those states that had a
slower growth in incarceration saw greater declines
in crime rates than states that had higher than
average growth rates.21 From 1998 through 2004,
twelve states whose imprisonment rates either held
steady or declined experienced a crime rate decline
equivalent to the national rate.22
Perhaps the most important fact about sentencing
and corrections that is overlooked by the American
public concerns the transitory nature of
incarceration. Missouri reports that, on average, 97
percent of imprisoned offenders will return to
society at some point.23 A review of release data
nationwide from 1980-2002 revealed a community
reentry rate of 95 percent.24 This is a sobering reality
that seems lost on those who stubbornly cling to the
belief that we can incarcerate our way out of the
crime problem. Every corrections dollar is spent not
to just to contain criminals, but rather to contain
criminals who in all likelihood will re-enter society.
Just how punishment affects recidivism is largely
misunderstood by system outsiders. Support for
spare and harsh conditions of confinement is
concomitant with the “get tough” and “lock ’em and
throw away the key” perspective. The notion that
21
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24
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tough punishment serves as a deterrent derives from
rational choice theory, which holds that crime is
controlled through fear of punishment. This is often
confused with the idea that harsher punishments
equate to less crime. In fact, Cesare Becarria, whose
classical criminology theory was the forerunner for
modern rational choice theory, did support
uniformly harsh penalties, but rather that the
punishment fit the crime. Excessive punishment,
Becarria maintained, is unnecessary and inefficient.
While there is evidence that some crime can be
deterred with appropriate application of penalties,
criminal behavior is far too complex a phenomenon
to be encompassed with this single theory. The fact
that brutal penalties do little to deter has long been
accepted as conventional wisdom by criminologists
and seasoned correctional practitioners. History
abounds with examples of the failure of even the
most horrific punishment to deter. The Ancient
Romans bundled up parricidal offenders into a bag
with a serpent, a dog, rooster, and primate and tossed
the lot into the sea.25 26 Despite seeing their
countrymen come to this painful end, Romans
continued to murder family members. Nor did other
forms of torture and execution that were common to
ancient societies, such as impalement, mutilation or
the Athenians’ method of slowly roasting criminals
inside a bronze bull (known as a “brazen bull”),27
take an appreciable bite out of crime.
Though more recent endeavors to scare offenders
away from crime have also not proven effective,
many Americans still embrace this idea. Such
support can be evidenced in the popularity of the sixterm sheriff of Arizona’s Maricopa County, Joe
Arpaio. Arpaio, who oversees the county’s jail, has
been widely praised for his use of tents to house
offenders in desert conditions exceeding 100
degrees, distribution of pink underwear, and chain
25
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27
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gangs. Yet despite Arpaio’s campaign claims, these
harsh conditions and attempts to demean offenders
have not been shown to affect recidivism. A study
comparing offenders released from the Maricopa
County Jail under Arpaio’s administration with those
released under the previous administration found no
significant differences in the recidivism rates.28
Public support for hard time is also reflected in the
rise of super-max facilities, which house unruly
offenders who fail to conform to rules at other
prisons. Typically, offenders in these facilities are
confined to their cells twenty-three hours a day.
Examination of recidivism rates for these facilities
offers further support that hard time does not deter
criminal behavior. A study of inmates released form
Washington state’s super-max facility found that
those released directly from super-max confinement
actually returned to prison at a faster rate than a
comparable group that had served time in traditional
facilities.29 When researchers examined recidivism
of the comparison group and that of super-max
offenders who were sent to a lower security facility
after leaving super-max pre-release, they found that
recidivism rates between the two groups did not
differ. A Florida study reached similar conclusions.
Inmates released from super-max confinement had
higher rates of violent recidivism than did a
comparable group of inmates who had served time at
lower security facilities, though there was no
relationship between timing of the super-max
experience, release, and recidivism.30 Nor are
offenders deterred by the experience of lengthy
incarceration. In fact, a meta-analysis of studies that
had tested the relationship between sentence length
and recidivism revealed a small positive correlation.
In other words, the longer the sentence, the higher
the recidivism rate.31 A comprehensive review of the
28
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30
Daniel Mears and William Bales, “Supermax Incarceration
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Government Services Canada, 1999,
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/e199912.htm.

6 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 1 (Fall/Winter 2013–14)

research found that, in general, offender behavior is
not deterred through use of harsh penalties.32
But imprisonment has other goals. One could argue
that the function our corrections system most
effectively achieves is incapacitation. It is nearly
impossible to refute that by removing offenders from
the community we constrain their illegal activity, if
only temporarily. If the period of incarceration
corresponds to the peak years of adult criminal
activity (late teens through late 20s), the impact on
crime can be substantial. Empirical evidence does
indicate that meaningful benefits accrue if we can
contain the most prolific career criminals for
relatively long periods of time.33 Economist Stephen
Levitt examined how mandated caps on prison
overcrowding affected the crime rate, and concluded
that for every person incarcerated, there were 15
fewer crimes.34 This finding would support prison
expansion. Levitt has tempered these findings by
noting it is primarily property crimes, not violent
ones, that were averted.35 An estimated 25 percent
drop in violent crime has been attributed to the
1990s incarceration boom.36 While not the impact
hoped for from sentencing reforms, when one
considers the impact in raw numbers, 25 percent less
violent crimes is meaningful. However, it is not clear
that indiscriminately sentencing all violent offenders
to lengthy sentences, which was the intent of truthin-sentencing (TIS) legislation, is a smart, costefficient policy.
32

Daniel S. Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the
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University of Chicago Press, 1998): 1-42.
33
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36
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One problem with long mandatory is that we limit
our ability to lock up the next generation of
offenders who are at large in the community. 37 This
returns us to the earlier point about opportunity
costs. There is a tipping point at which resources are
over-allocated into imprisonment, and we sacrifice
opportunities to address the newly emerging
generation of offenders. Under the TIS laws in many
states, violent offenders must serve 85 percent of
their sentence. Prisons are now home to a larger
proportion of offenders who are past middle age
(and well past their peak offending years) than has
been the case in the past.38 This situation will clearly
worsen over time. The Missouri Department of
Corrections’ percentage of incarcerated offenders
over the age of 50 doubled between 2000-2010.39
These older offenders require more costly medical
services in an era in which medical costs are rising
— in fact, it is estimated that elderly offenders’
healthcare costs are three times that of younger
offenders.40 Many aging offenders are serving
lengthy sentences for drug crimes, a consequence of
America’s “war on drugs” that resulted in lengthier
sentences. This crusade had its most profound
impact on federal prison populations, although state
prisons have been affected as well.
In the two decades since the sentencing reforms
were ushered in, we have seen both intended positive
consequences and unintended impacts, including the
cost of prison expansion. Imprisonment was among
the factors augmenting the decline of crime in the
late 20th and early 21st century, though processes
beyond tough sentencing and expanded capacity also
played an important role. Collectively, the evidence
37
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38
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United States,” Human Rights Watch, 2012, accessed
December 20, 2013,
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112we
bwcover_0_0.pdf.
39
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accessed November 1, 2013,
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40
William E. Adams and William E. Adams Jr., “The
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humanitarian concerns,” Nova Law Review 19 (1995): 465-486.
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points to the value of allocating prison space
selectively. In order to advance this goal, states need
to revisit legislation that requires lengthy mandatory
sentences and consider mechanisms for releasing
offenders previously sentenced under these laws.
Indeed, many states have already have begun this
process and have repealed mandatory sentencing
statutes. Also, sentencing commissions should
promote more consistent use of actuarial tools for
determining which offenders present the greatest risk
to re-offend. These should allow for more precise
targeting than did the typical sentencing reforms of
the late 1980s and ’90s, which were directed at
broad categories of offense types.
It would be remiss to discuss the functions of our
corrections system without noting that for many
Americans, sentencing is seen as a means for
achieving retribution. None of the above discussion
should be construed to diminish the right of citizens
in a democratic society to demand retribution if that
is what they deem important. Retribution is an
abstract, emotionally-laden concept and does not fit
neatly into a treatise on cost-efficiency and other
pragmatic concerns. In this sense, justice is not about
reducing future crime, and operates independently of
deterrence. Justice is compromised if we structure
sentences so that the risk of recidivism outweighs
the nature of the act. Thus, the model of selective
incapacitation should be applied not only to the
group at high-risk for violent and chronic offending.
It may also be used to achieve retribution for those
cases in which the crimes are most egregious and
damaging, regardless of risk propensity.
Because states have begun backing away from
mandatory sentencing laws, discretion has been
returned to judges in recent years. If judges increase
their reliance on statistically-derived risk assessment
tools we can achieve a balance between excessive
use of discretion and tight mandates.41 These
assessment tools, like the aforementioned Missouri
matrix, can be quite valuable in the sentencing
process. Judges are not adverse to making riskdriven decisions, and often make subjective risk
41

“Innovations in Community Corrections: Controlling Crime,
Prison Populations and Cost,” National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2010,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/pew/innovations.pdf.

assessments which play a substantial role in how
they sentence offenders. Yet such subjective
assessments have found to be only modestly valid.42
Repeatedly, actuarial risk tools have been found to
have superior predictive ability to the subjective
prediction of even seasoned criminal justice
practitioners.43
Maximizing long-term outcomes
If we do begin investing a lesser share of public
expenditures in our nation’s prison systems, we need
to “reinvest” in measures that can successfully
reduce crime. The body of literature that addresses
“smart on crime” policies calls for a three-pronged
approach: selective incapacitation of high-risk
violent offenders, rehabilitation and reintegration of
lower risk non-violent offenders, and primary
prevention initiatives.
The day-to-day of prison operations is largely out of
public view, and as a result, taxpayers are not
familiar with the needs of a typical prison
community and the issues administrators face in
managing budgets. The importance of daily prison
life to rehabilitation and re-entry is misunderstood
and under-appreciated by the public. Even if we
endeavor to focus on incarcerating only the most
violence-prone offenders, we cannot abandon the
practice of operating prisons as full communities.
The experience of incarceration and therefore how
corrections dollars are allocated is critical to public
safety. In recent decades, Americans have been
supportive of correctional expenditures related to
expansion but little else.
42

Don M. Gottfredson, “Effects of Judges' Sentencing
Decisions on Criminal Careers,”
National Institute of Justice (Series: Research in Brief),
November 1999.
43
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Vacaville: California Medical Facility (1961); T.R. Holland, N.
Holt, M. Levi, and G.E. Beckett, “Comparison and
combination of clinical and statistical predictions of recidivism
among adult offenders,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, no.
2 (1983): 203-211; Christopher Baird and Dennis Wagner,
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no. 11-12 (November-December 2000): 839-871.
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Media coverage on the costs of corrections tends to
focus on two dimensions of corrections spending:
the construction costs, and amenities such as
exercise equipment and cable television. Yet
corrections is far more than bricks and mortar. A
functional prison requires the typical costs of any
residential community, such as utilities, healthcare,
food, and maintenance. Staffing needs go well
beyond custodial positions (“guards,” more
commonly referred to today as correctional officers),
and includes food service, maintenance and clerical
personnel, administrators, medical and mental health
professionals, teachers, and staff trainers. Labor
costs can be offset with the much cheaper inmate
labor, but nevertheless, a typical 1,000 bed facility
may have 200-300 paid employees.
Furthermore, the perceived “frills” found in
American prisons have minimal impact on budgets.
The media accounts of these luxuries often infuriate
the public and feed hyperbolic political rhetoric,
which in turn fuels support for harsher conditions.
Yet most of these costs are not borne by the
taxpayer. In Missouri, for example, inmates pay a
mark-up on items purchased in prison commissaries,
and this overage is diverted into a fund from which
inmates may purchase cable packages, or new
weight machines.44
Those recreational and
vocational activities that are supported by tax dollars
are generally not costly and have little impact on the
overall budget. When corrections budgets are cut,
administrators cannot solve the problem simply by
scaling back the amenities. Furthermore, long-term
correctional employees realize the value in keeping
inmates occupied and can leverage amenities to
minimize disruptions. This results in a safer
environment for staff and prisoners while
minimizing opportunities for criminal activity.
If we expect to return offenders to society at
lower risk, we would do well to cultivate
correctional communities that offer opportunities for
self-improvement and foster skills necessary for
successful reintegration. Currently, there is a good
deal of confusion among not just the general public,
but even criminal justice practitioners, regarding the
44
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status of research on rehabilitation. In 1974, Robert
Martinson published “What Works?”, a famous, oftquoted and often misrepresented meta-analysis of
correctional rehabilitative effort.45 Martinson’s work
cast a long shadow on the future of rehabilitation.
The popular interpretation was “nothing works,”
even though a number of weaknesses in his work
have emerged over the years. For one, Martinson
defined “rehabilitation” over-broadly, and included
studies of programs with very different structures,
target clientele, and of widely varying intensity and
duration. Many of the studies had no measure of
“treatment integrity,” which concerns the duration
and intensity of treatment programs, as well as the
frequency with which offenders engage in the
intervention.
Offender
participation
in
a
rehabilitative program was operationalized in
different ways in the studies he included. In some
cases, participation meant some contact with
program staff. In other words, in some cases, the
offenders did not need to meet any criteria for
program completion in order to be included in one of
the studies in the analysis. In the years since “What
Works?” was published, researchers challenged
Martinson’s conclusions, reanalyzed his data and
carried out further analysis of rehabilitative efforts.
The efforts resulted in identification of many types
of treatment interventions that do work, and that can
significantly reduce re-offense and re-incarceration
rates. This body of literature is perhaps best
summarized in Paul Gendreau and Robert Ross’s
survey of over 200 studies. They concluded:
“Our reviews of the research literature
demonstrated that successful rehabilitation of
offenders had been accomplished, and
continued to be accomplished quite well . . .
reductions in recidivism, sometimes as
substantial as 80 percent, had been achieved
45

Robert Martinson, “What Works, Questions and Answers
about Prison Reform,” The Public Interest 35 (1974): 22-54.
Though this is the familiar quoted piece, the full study was
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Martinson, and J. Wilks, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (New
York: Praeger Publishers Inc, 1975).
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in a considerable number of well-controlled
studies.” 46
While rehabilitative efforts occurring in prison
settings had lower success rates than those in the
community, these nevertheless have had positive
impacts. Gendreau and Ross also noted that these
results were not short-lived, as many studies had two
years of follow-up, with some exceeding even this
standard.
Yet empirical evidence often takes a backseat to
perceptions, and fear of crime translates into reduced
support for rehabilitation. As fear builds,
rehabilitative efforts are framed as sympathetic to
offenders and anti-public safety, a political strategy
popular after the Martinson study was published.
Support for rehabilitation has never returned to preMartinson levels. Certainly, the crime surge of the
late 20th century did not help matters. It is perhaps
surprising, then, to find that rehabilitation efforts are
underway in most of America’s prisons. Substance
abuse treatment and vocational training/educational
activities are most prevalent. Most facilities also
offer facilitated self-help programs, and therapy
directed at special groups of offenders. The intensity
and quality of these efforts varies greatly, though.
Many do not adequately match the criteria laid out in
the literature that are critical in order to produce
positive results. When these programs fail, they
erode support even further.
A full agenda for change, while ambitious, requires
an investment in high-quality, rigorous, evidencebased programs that carefully target offenders and
match treatment to offender needs. Ideally, this
involves replicating programs with proven track
records. While limited grant funding is available to
launch such programs, states need to commit to
long-term funding to not only maintain treatment,
but to periodically engage in outcome evaluations of
these efforts.
If we are to reap the benefits of rehabilitation that
begins behind bars, we must continue strengthening
practices for managing offenders post-release. In the
46
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long run, releasing offenders into society without a
safety net only serves to maintain the status quo,
with the tradeoff of high recidivism rates or costly
incapacitation. And, as noted earlier, for most
offenders, the crime reduction achieved by
incapacitation is only temporary. Successful
reintegration strategies hold promise for reducing
future offending, which means not only cost benefits
but even greater benefits in reduced victimization.
Moreover, these strategies can realize cost savings
through more efficient means for handling parole
violations. Violations may signify offenders falling
into criminal patterns again, but also may reflect
inadequate support systems, lack of job skills, and
other adjustment difficulties. With supervision and
support, many of these offenders can remain safely
in the community and not burden taxpayers.
Community support for parole and reintegration
programs has waxed and waned throughout
corrections history. Public discomfort with parole in
part comes from failure to recognize that in the vast
majority of cases denial of parole delays release, but
does not prevent it. In the vast majority of cases,
offenders denied parole do not spend the rest of their
lives behind bars. Media coverage regarding new
crimes by paroled offenders often suggests that the
crime would not have occurred had the offender not
been paroled. While it is indisputable that any one
particular crime that happens when an offender is on
parole could have been avoided, delaying release
may not decrease the overall likelihood that an
offender will eventually return to crime.
Yet, today, and in the past, measures that result in
offenders serving less time are often misrepresented
as liberal, naïve approaches to pamper criminals and
reduce accountability. But those who have worked in
the trenches of corrections historically have been
among the staunchest supporters of minimizing use
of imprisonment and more expansive and creative
use of community supervision, and have long
struggled to counter public perceptions. Indeed,
some of the most revered figures in corrections
history have championed early release. Lewis
Lawes, the renowned penologist who helmed the
New York state penitentiary, Sing Sing, from 19191942 crusaded zealously for greater use of
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indeterminate sentencing.47 In a piece for Harper’s
Monthly Magazine written in 1938, Lawes refuted
the then-popular view that supervised release
coddles prisoners and argued strenuously for its
value in promoting public safety.48 The situation
Lawes encountered is quite similar to that nearly a
full century later, with criminal justice scholars and
system professionals advocating policy responses
that are rejected by the public.
An unexpected upside of budget shortfalls is a
willingness to consider new directions, or expand
into directions that may not be politically popular,
but that can have positive fiscal impacts. In 2003, the
Vera Institute and National Conference of State
Legislatures convened a roundtable discussion with
legislators from nine states to address the budget
crisis they were facing. Among the practices that
were reported to be underway were the repeal of
mandatory minimum laws, adjusting release
mechanisms to spur earlier release, and expanded
use of diversionary programs, probation, and
treatment for drug offenders.49 The discussion was
tempered with the recognition that the public may
not embrace such changes, and that politicians
themselves had often played to public fear by
promulgating the get-tough approaches. As Sen. Don
Redfern (R-Iowa) noted:
“We’re going to have to convince them that the
kinds of things we’re doing are not going to
jeopardize public safety, but make cost-effective
sense — plus prepare someone, because most of our
prisoners eventually get out.”50
In the past decade, the Council of State Governments
has been vigorously extolling the benefits of re-entry
programs, cataloguing and evaluating state
initiatives.51 The catchphrase “reinvestment in
47
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justice” is gaining increasing popularity with the
judiciary and correctional administrators, as well as
elected officials. States are exploring crime
reduction through use of evidence-based practices to
strengthen community supervision, which includes
providing access to services to assist offenders
reentering the community. The array of services
extends to securing stable housing, mental health
and drug and alcohol treatment, job training and
placement, and parenting classes. Collectively, these
approaches are intended to aid offenders in
establishing a stake in the community and building
support systems.
States are faced with the choice of trying to forge
ahead under fiscal pressure or cutting programs to
achieve short-term gains, and many are moving
forward. In 2002, Missouri’s Department of
Corrections (MDOC) began implementation of a
massive initiative to reduce crime through more
effectively transitioning offenders back into society.
The Missouri Reentry Process is working to leverage
costs through engaging other state agencies in the
initiative, along with non-profit service providers,
higher education institutions, churches, and other
faith-based groups. Even Texas, legendary for its
tough-on-crime stance, has bowed to pragmatism in
recent years. The Lone Star State began exploring
alternatives to long-term incarceration and refined its
core mission. A pivotal point was when the
legislature faced a projected $2 billion in
construction costs over a five-year period if they
were to keep up the pace of incarceration.52 In 2007,
the state instead opted to sink $241 million on
diversion sentencing and other treatment programs.
Primary prevention falls outside the scope of
corrections spending, but an argument can be made
that in the long run, we can reduce the toll of crime
if we invest in programs that start long before
Council of State Governments. Reentry Policy Council. New
York: Council of State Governments, January 2005,
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criminal behavior emerges. The reward and cost
savings, of course, will not be reaped for several
years. Evidence-based practices include early
interventions designed to produce changes in
participants’ lives throughout their life spans. One
example is Michigan’s famed High/Scope Perry
Preschool Project, an intervention stunning in its
simplicity. The program consisted of a high-quality
preschool program for at-risk African-American
children living in an impoverished community.
Program staff offered 2.5 hours daily of educational
activities and weekly home visits to encourage
healthy development in participants for up to three
years. In addition to myriad other social benefits,
subjects randomly assigned to the project were
significantly less likely to be arrested for violent,
property and drug crimes from various life stages
beginning in adolescence up to age 40. They were
also less likely to spend time incarcerated, with 28
percent of the preschool group and 52 percent of the
controls being sentenced to jail or prison.53 Results
of a cost-benefit analysis suggest savings of $68,584
to the potential victims of crimes never committed,
and $15,240 in savings from costs of dispensing
justice.54 Other programs described in the “what
works” literature take a similar approach in targeting
established risk factors and helping those at-risk to
develop protective factors and competencies to
improve a range of life outcomes.
Organizations representing front-line crime fighters
increasingly are realizing the value of preventing
crime in the early years. The International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National
Sheriffs’ Association, and the National District
Attorneys Association, have all put forth official
resolutions supporting the efforts of Fight Crime:
Invest in Kids. This national, non-profit group
promotes awareness of the tremendous cost savings
and public safety benefits that can be reaped through

enhanced investment in programs such as preschools, after-school programs — in short, programs
that can be implemented at relatively low cost to
taxpayers yet have far-reaching impacts on
community safety and the cost of fighting crime.55
Prognosis
Clearly, crime is a complex, multi-causal
phenomenon to which there are no simple solutions,
and no single method for reducing it. As stated in the
introduction, the direction of corrections and the
impact on state budgets is never easy to predict.
Judging from how prison populations grew in the
last part of the 20th and early 21st century, it is not
likely that corrections costs will drop significantly in
the near future. In fact, as the demographic shifts so
that a larger percentage of the population is between
the ages of 15-30, we may experience another crime
surge in the next decade.
The optimal balance of fiscal responsibility and
public safety may best be achieved though (a)
abolishing most mandatory sentences, and
supporting legislation that allows states to release
offenders committed under these laws who present
as low-risk; (b) expanded use of empiricallygenerated, risk-based sentencing tools to capture the
benefits of selective incapacitation; and (c)
investment in evidence-based practices in the areas
of prevention, rehabilitation and re-entry.
Our communities will to continue to struggle to dole
out penalties in a manner that is both just and costeffective. At this juncture, the national trend towards
“smart sentencing” and reinvestments in long-term
gains can be seen as promising, though how long
these efforts are sustained remains to be seen.
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